Introduction
Predictions: a universal principle in the operation of the human brain
Just as physicists can explain complex systems with a small set of elegant equations (e.g. Maxwell's), it might be possible for the multidisciplinary study of the brain to produce a list of well-defined universal principles that can explain the majority of its operation. Given exciting developments in theory, empirical findings and computational studies, it seems that the generation of predictions might be one strong candidate for such a universal principle. Predictions in the brain is the focus of the collection of papers in this special theme issue. The word 'focus' might be misleading, however, because these papers range from addressing cellular underpinnings to computational principles to cognition, emotion and happiness, and they cover predictions that range from the next turn for a rat navigating a maze to predictions required in social interactions. We learn, encode, recollect, attend, recognize, evaluate, feel and act. The papers presented in this issue put forth neural models describing the possible interactions between these rich processes and the predictions-related mechanisms that connect them.
Some of the papers may appear almost synonymously describing similar ideas, which is an encouraging sign of potential validity. For example, the idea that predictions rely on memory. Indeed, it is hard to think of what other source if not memory can mediate predictions, but those proposals are in agreement with many of the details, including the cortical structures involved (e.g. medial temporal lobe and medial prefrontal cortex), the complexity of the underlying memory structures, the way they are encoded and the reconstructive way by which they are recalled and used in predictions.
On the other hand, some papers might seem to contradict each other. For example, the issue of whether foresight is exclusive to humans. There seems to be evidence either way, and the question is whether the fact that rats, for example, show future planning-like operations such as transitive inference Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009 ) 364, 1181 -1182 doi:10.1098 /rstb.2008 One contribution of 18 to a Theme Issue 'Predictions in the brain: using our past to prepare for the future'.
and prediction of upcoming positions implies that they are able to predict in the same way as humans, or similarly but to a lower capacity, or not at all, and these demonstrations in non-humans can instead be interpreted as something different from foresight. Other interesting debates include whether the underlying computational principles are Bayesian in nature or not. Such orthogonal proposals are particularly interesting because they show how the same solutions can be reached via different mechanisms and pathways. As much as this collection answers important questions, it raises and emphasizes outstanding ones. How are experiences coded optimally to afford using them for predictions? What is the mechanism underlying reconstruction, and how do we construct a new simulation from separate memories? How specific in detail are future-related mental simulations, and when do they rely on imagery, concepts or language? What is the difference in mechanism and cortical underpinnings of predictions that stem from sequence memory (i.e. replaying existing memories) and predictions that stem from construction? What is the role of hierarchies in representations and predictions? It is hoped that the questions that emerge from this issue will inspire and steer future research on future-related mental processes.
Let me conclude this introduction with an intriguing analogy. The fighter plane F-16 is the first aeroplane intentionally designed to have an aerodynamically unstable platform. This design was chosen to enhance the aircraft's manoeuvrability. Most aeroplanes are designed to be stable such that they strive to return to their original attitude following an interruption. While such stability is a desired property for a passenger aeroplane, for example, it opposes a pilot's effort to change headings rapidly and thus can degrade manoeuvring performance required for a fighter jet. This behaviour has led to a saying among pilots that 'you do not fly an F-16, it flies you' (http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/F-16_Fighting_Falcon). As is evident from the collection of articles presented in this issue, the brain might be similarly flexible and 'restless' by default. This restlessness does not reflect random activity that is there merely for the sake of remaining active, but, instead, it reflects the ongoing generation of predictions, which relies on memory and enhances our interaction with and adjustment to the demanding environment.
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